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Many people hold this truth to be self-evident, that there should be more female students in
science and engineering. Typical arguments include possible benefits to women, possible benefits
to the economy, and the unfairness of the current female under-representation. However, these
justifications are never explicitly and thoroughly presented. Clearly stating and scrutinizing them,
we show that they in fact have logical flaws. When made consistent, these arguments do not
unconditionally justify enrolling more women in scientific disciplines. In particular, what women
want must be taken into account. Outreach programs towards K–12 girls must therefore purport
to allow them to choose a field freely, rather than try to draw as many of them to scientific
disciplines as possible. This change of mindset must be accompanied by a close examination of
the purpose and effects of these programs.
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I. INTRODUCTION — RAISING A HORSE FROM THE DEAD
Far fewer women than men study science and engineering. It is often argued that women would
benefit from graduating in a scientific discipline, due to higher salaries and the possibility to help
others. Having more female engineers would also be beneficial to the economy because of the increasing
need for engineers and of the positive impact of diversity on designs. Another argument is that this
under-representation of women is unfair. The question is then how to enroll more women in scientific
disciplines.
In most articles on the subject, justifications for a greater female enrollment are relegated to the
introduction (i.e. the only part of the article that needs not be in any way original). Some provide no
justification at all or very vague ones, such as “for a variety of practical and moral reasons” (Felder
et al., 1995). The closest authors get to presenting arguments is naming them: they mention the
name of an argument —rather than the argument itself—, say that it has been widely used (probably
implying that it must therefore be valid), and move on. They for instance say “a lot of people argue for
diversity in terms of fairness [ . . . ] but that’s not my argument” (Wulf, 1998), “fairness is one answer,
but certainly not the only one” (Gosink, 2001), or “aside from the obvious issues of access, fairness
and equity” (Sullivan et al., 2003) without ever actually making these arguments explicit. Yet, such
words do not imply the existence (let alone the validity) of arguments any more than dragons exist
because the word ‘dragon’ does. In fact, everyone is so convinced that asking why there should be
more female students in science and engineering would be beating a dead horse that nobody checked
whether the horse was dead.
They would reply that their arguments need not be made explicit because they are obvious. Also
‘obvious’ is the revolution of the sun around the earth. Philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said that
“it requires a very unusual mind to undertake the analysis of the obvious.” Such a mind should not
be very unusual amongst scientists and engineers. They should be able and willing to “undertake the
analysis of the obvious.” In the present context, this requires a precise study of these justifications,
even (or especially) when they seem obvious. The least this will take is to state arguments explicitly
and clearly rather than glibly allude to them. Logic and accuracy are still invaluable and should still
be used outside of science.
The objective of WISEST (2007) at the University of Alberta is “to investigate the reasons why
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2few young women are choosing careers in the sciences and engineering [and] to take action to alter the
situation.” This means trying to solve a problem before knowing whether it exists at all. Yet, science
and engineering have been successful in part because we first understand phenomena before using that
knowledge for specific purposes. One would expect scientists to apply the high standards of science to
the issue at hand: understanding should precede action. If an argument justifies a higher enrollment
only under certain conditions, the actions one takes cannot contradict these conditions. Otherwise,
the policy is literaly unjustified. As with a mathematical theorem, if the assumptions under which the
argument was obtained do not hold, neither does the conclusion. Therefore, one cannot decorrelate
justification and action.
Several kinds of arguments are often mentioned. While more arguments may strengthen one’s
position, it also means a greater probability that they be mutually exclusive. For instance, some
argue that a greater female enrollment in science and engineering is good for the fields —but not
necessarily for the women themselves—, whereas to others it is a matter of freedom of choice. While
each of these arguments might justify a greater female enrollment, they are obviously incompatible.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the arguments most commonly invoked to justify a greater
female enrollment in science and engineering. In particular, one must make sure that they are self-
consistent, that they do entail what they are supposed to prove, and that they are not incompatible.
Philosopher and Nobel laureate Bertrand Russell pointed out that “everything is vague to a degree
you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise.” We will try to make all arguments precise and
oftentimes realize how vague (or ambiguous) they indeed were. Section II focuses on four arguments:
higher salaries, the possibility to help others, the positive impact of diversity on designs, and the
increasing need for engineers. Section III is about fairness and under-representation. Section IV
considers some consequences for policy of the arguments scrutinized in the previous two sections.
II. MUTUAL ATTRACTION
A. Motivating science and engineering
As technology plays an ever-increasing role in society and economy, the number of engineering
graduates must increase. And since females and minorities are under-represented they offer great
potential sources of engineers (Baum, 1990; Brainard & Carlin, 1998; Chen et al., 1996; Cuny &
Aspray, 2000; Grose, 2006; Lane, 1999; Moskal, 2000; Rockland et al., 2002; Sullivan et al., 2003;
Wulf, 1998; Zywno et al., 1999). Furthermore, more women in science and engineering would be good
because of the greater variety of designs which more diverse teams could invent (Cuny & Aspray,
2000; Gosink, 2001; Lane, 1999; Moskal, 2000; Wulf, 1998).
These arguments seem altruistic since women can contribute to the economy: “More compelling
arguments have been raised that recognize the direct benefits that female participation is likely to
have upon these fields.” (Moskal, 2000). But compelling for whom? These arguments may efficiently
motivate science and engineering to attract women, but this is not sufficient. In essence, these argu-
ments treat women as mere pawns to be transferred from one department to another based on some
external reason (e.g. the economy). Can one force somebody to do something for the sake of others?
According to Immanuel Kant (1785), this is wrong because one should never treat people merely as
means, but always as ends. To utilitarians, good means maximizing the happiness of the greatest
number (Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1871); if women do not want to become engineers, having more of
them in the field will decrease their happiness while increasing that of others only marginally. (One
can notice that forbidding that students choose their field freely and getting the best students to fields
which are deemed a priority by the State is typically a practice of dictatorships, not democracies.)
These economic arguments achieve the great fit of getting to agree (against them) ethical views
which seldom do so: be it from a Kantian or a utilitarian viewpoint, these arguments must be rejected
if women do not want to study science and engineering, i.e. they are not valid justifications on their
own. That science and engineering should want to attract women does not imply that there has to
be more women in science and engineering: what women want is crucial.
Some disagree and argue that one needs more female engineers independently of what women want.
Whether this is correct or not, one must at the very least be consistent and apply the same rule
to all possible contributions to the economy. If child labor and child pornography can benefit the
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the issue altogether; this is ever popular yet not quite satisfying. One may stand by the premise of
efficacy maximization and accept its logical consequences; this is self-consistent but will never get
wide approval. One may claim that there exist particular cases; but a rule with too many exceptions
is not a rule at all. One may provide a refined argument which does not endorse child labor and
child pornography; but this path is at best narrow and it may not even exist. Finally, one may look
for an argument of a completely different nature, which would not have the dreadful consequences of
efficacy; this we will attempt in Sec. III.
B. Motivating women
Another common argument is that “the compensation in science-related fields is often higher than
that of other fields. By not participating in science-related fields, women are barred from the economic
rewards of these fields.” (Moskal, 2000). Sullivan et al. (2003) make it clear early that engineering
means money by paying high school girls to attend their summer engineering workshop. However, if
money were all that matters, why would there be engineering schools at all, given that engineering
professors could earn more in industry? Apparently, women do not pick a field trying to maximize
their income either: “clearly, if monetary incentives were enough, current starting salaries would have
already fixed the problem” (Wulf, 1998).
Women are more likely to stress interpersonal factors (e.g. helping others), whereas men tend to
value money and status more (Eccles, 1994; Morgan et al., 2001). Would engineering allow women
to help others? The president of the U. S. National Academy of Engineering argues that engineering
does have a positive impact on society and provides an opportunity to help others (Wulf, 1998). Let
us assume for the sake of argument that he is right. What does this argument actually prove? It
shows that women are wrong if they choose not to study engineering because they believe that it will
not allow them to help others. That is, such an argument shows that women should want to major
in engineering. It does not show that there has to be more women in engineering.
C. Four shortcomings of the argument by mutual attraction
We must first notice that taken in isolation demographics, better designs, higher salaries, and
helping others all fail to justify anything. It is necessary that both women and the fields have an
interest in an increased female enrollment, i.e. it is necessary to invoke these arguments together.
Although having only one argument is not as satisfying as having four, it can be sufficient. But is this
argument really satisfactory?
Do women want to marry engineering? They do. Does engineering want to marry women? It
does. It is clear that they should marry. But if they decide not to, does one have a good reason to
marry them against their will? Let us consider a simple analogy. We had two bottles of champagne
and drank one, therefore there should be one left. Here ‘should’ obviously has to do with a rational
expectation based on the circumstances: it would not be immoral if it turned out that no champagne
was left, it would be illogical. Something must be wrong with the premise: maybe we drank the
second bottle or we had only one to begin with. Saying that since there should remain a bottle and
none is to be found, we should go buy another one to solve the problem would be solving the wrong
problem. Likewise, the fact that one would expect more women in science and engineering does not
necessarily imply that one should increase female enrollment. In essence, this argument by mutual
attraction tells us what to expect but does not provide us with any justification to make it happen if
it does not spontaneously take place. In other words, ‘more women should be enrolled’ does not imply
‘we should enroll more women.’ As Appiah (2005) points out, “my life’s shape is up to me [ . . . ],
even if I make a life that is less good than a life I could have made. All of us could, no doubt, have
made better lives than we have: but that is no reason for others to attempt to force these better lives
upon us.” This impossibility to intervene makes this argument rather weak.
Since the needs of the economy and the possibility to help others are not universal, neither is the
win-win situation. For instance, it is doubtful that all engineers have a positive impact on society: do
weapons of war and buggy operating systems help others? Even if it is because of a small minority,
the claim that engineering has a positive impact on society collapses: only certain jobs would be
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decrease due to recession, outsourcing, etc.) and engineers from all fields are not wanted everywhere
all the time. The question ‘should there be more women in engineering?’ is thus meaningless: there
are as many questions as fields, times, places, etc. You can justify all female enrollment some of the
time, and some female enrollment all the time, but you cannot justify all female enrollment all the
time. What looked like a justification for a greater female enrollment in science and engineering is in
fact career counseling.
Those arguing in favor of a greater female enrollment in scientific fields typically fail to notice that
these extra female students must come from somewhere. But whence? If getting more female engineers
means fewer female physicians, it is not necessarily an improvement (it may be bad for the population
or for female representation in medicine). The question of women in science and engineering cannot
be addressed in a vacuum: indirect effects also matter. In mathematical terms: one needs to use
differentials rather than partial derivatives. What is needed is a global rather than a local optimum;
that more female engineers would be a good is irrelevant if more female physicians would be even
better.
D. Two notes on diversity
Anderson & Northwood (2002) want to “increase diversity in engineering” but never explain why
diversity should be increased in the first place. This is typical of a tendency to use ‘diversity’ meta-
physically, taking it to be intrinsically valuable. Although ‘should there be more women?’ and ‘should
there be more diversity?’ may seem equivalent in our context, the answer to the latter question is
necessarily yes since diversity is presented as necessarily good. But then, one should increase diversity
in terms of men/women but also for blond/dark hair, short/tall, slim/fat, and even smart/stupid.
Many will complain that these categories are completely irrelevant. But what is the criterion for
relevance? For it to exist, there must be a reason why diversity is good (relevant meaning congruent
with this reason). If there is no specific reason why diversity is good, there cannot be such a thing as
irrelevant criteria. Clearly, the idea that diversity is good in and for itself is not tenable. Diversity is
valuable only in its consequences and the actuality of these consequences must be explicitly shown.
One should also notice that women are not the only ones who can contribute to diversity. Foreigners
(possibly hired due to the lack of local engineers) undoubtedly bring new ideas, which can lead to
new designs. The low enrollment in engineering schools is therefore beneficial to society since it leads
to better designs. This is another example of incompatible arguments: if diversity is crucial then low
overall enrollment in scientific fields is a solution, not a problem.
III. FAIRNESS
The argument by mutual attraction examined in the previous section turns out to be much weaker
than its proponents believe. Another possible argument for an increased female enrollment is fairness.
Typically, one just utters the word ‘fairness’ and expects everybody to bow. There seems to be no
need to clarify what one means by ‘fair’ nor in what a higher female enrollment would be fair. It is
common to use ‘fair’ in a very loose way, as a synonym of ‘moral’ or ‘good.’ In this case, it has no
precise meaning, just a vague positive value: ‘we should do what is fair’ then means ‘we should do
what is good’, i.e. ‘we should do what we should do.’ This tautology is obviously useless. For fairness
to be of any use, it must have a precise meaning.
A. The superiority of science and engineering
Another way to construe fairness is to say that science and engineering being superiorly good,
everybody should have access to them. This is true of freedom, justice, education, etc. Yet, this
requires that these fields be indeed superior. Based on some criteria they may be, but then one
needs to show that these criteria are intrinsically superior to any other, with the risk of an infinite
regression. Moreover, most fields are probably convinced of their own superiority (like most religions
are convinced that they are the one true religion) and there is no reason to assume that science and
5engineering are right and everybody else is wrong. So far, no demonstration of the superiority of
scientific disciplines has been provided. The burden of proof is on those who hold that all fields are
not equally acceptable career choices (just like one assumes that people are equal and demands that
anyone claiming otherwise provide a proof that all humans are not equal.)
B. Under-representation: statistical viewpoint
It is taken for granted that women are under-represented in science and engineering and that their
enrollment should therefore be increased (Anderson & Northwood, 2002; Baum, 1990; Brainard &
Carlin, 1998; Chen et al., 1996; Chubin et al., 2005; Cohoon, 2002; Roberts et al., 2002; Sullivan
et al., 2003; Zywno et al., 1999). Yet, as Russell pointed out, “in all affairs it’s a healthy thing now
and then to hang a question mark on the things you have long taken for granted.”
As a matter of fact, “while women make up over 50% of the college-age population in the U.S.,
they represent a small minority among engineering students” (Chen et al., 1996). Yet, does it really
imply that it is “critically important that the causes for the low enrollment and high attrition rates
of female engineering students be identified and eliminated” (Chen et al., 1996)? This claim relies on
the simplest and most common of arguments based on under-representation: having no argument at
all (Anderson & Northwood, 2002; Baum, 1990; Brainard & Carlin, 1998; Chen et al., 1996; Chubin
et al., 2005; Cohoon, 2002; Morgan et al., 2001; Roberts et al., 2002; Sullivan et al., 2003; Zywno
et al., 1999). (1) Women are under-represented. (2) Their enrollment ought to be increased. (3) They
are not under-represented any more. QED.
Yet, under-representation is of a statistical nature (lower proportion of women than in the overall
population), it is neither good nor bad per se (Bouville, 2007). Despite what Chubin et al. (2005)
believe, “improving” or “promoting” the number of women does not have any meaning whatsoever.
The claim that “the numbers speak for themselves, demonstrating a significant problem in recruiting
and retaining women.” (Baum, 1990) is ventriloquism. If under-representation were wrong in itself
then the under-representation of women in prison would imply that there should be more female
inmates. It should now be obvious that one cannot simply say without any explanation that because
there are few women in science and engineering there ought to be more (saying that there are too
few women would already assume that there ought to be more). As David Hume (1739–40) pointed
out, one must be very careful when trying to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ If one means to equate
under-representation and unfairness, a link between the two must be provided explicitly.
C. Under-representation: ethical viewpoint
Under-representation taken in this crude statistical sense is obvious but irrelevant. Some, such
as Cuny & Aspray (2000), seem to vaguely see that the problem cannot be purely statistical as
“underrepresentation translates into a loss of opportunity for individuals” (emphasis added), yet they
do not grasp the implications since they still aim for “an effort by all departments to increase the total
number of women.” For under-representation to be a valid argument, it indeed must be (re)defined
to be ethical, rather than statistical, in nature. The way to do this is to change the reference from
the average population to the situation in a perfectly fair world, i.e. a world devoid of prejudice,
discrimination, and other biases. Women are then said to be under-represented if the level of female
enrollment in the actual world is lower than what it would be in a perfectly fair world. This new
definition is less straightforward than comparing enrollment to the proportion of women in the overall
population but it can link under-representation to unfairness, which the latter cannot do. In particular,
it does not justify an increase of the number of female inmates, which is obviously an improvement.
One speaks of equal opportunity when people who have equivalent abilities and who perform an
equivalent amount of work reach equivalent results. In a perfectly fair world, men and women would
obviously have equal opportunities. What about the real world? The low enrollment of females in
science and engineering indicates that they do not reach similar results. But do men and women
have similar abilities? Moreover, there can be unfairness only if women who want to study science
are barred from the field, not if low enrollment springs from low interest. We must therefore examine
both the abilities and motivations of women compared to men.
6D. Sexual differences in abilities and occupational interests
Due to the greater variability of males compared to females, men are over-represented at the top
(Hedges & Nowell, 1995) and at the bottom of intellectual ability, e.g. four times as many boys as girls
are dyslexic (Kleinfeld, 1998). Moreover, men and women have different strengths: women typically
have better verbal skills and men mathematical and spatial abilities. This difference is (at least in
part) hormonal and has been observed in non-human species (Browne, 2005). Men and women do not
differ only in terms of abilities, they also make different choices. On Holland’s vocational interest test,
women score higher on the “artistic” and “social” dimensions and men on the “investigative” and
“realistic” (relevant to science and engineering) dimensions (Kaufman & McLean, 1998). Part of the
difference is biological: many sex-differentiated behaviors appear at an early age when children are
unable to identify sexes (Connellan et al., 2000; Serbin et al., 2001) and sexual differences of taste have
been found in other species (Alexander & Hines, 2002). Part of the difference is due to socialization:
parents, teachers, and the students themselves typically have lower expectations in math for girls
compared to boys (Hyde et al., 1990; Jacobs & Eccles, 1985).
While social biases would not exist in a perfectly fair world, biological differences would. Hence,
all we can conclude is that the fair level of enrollment is above the current figure (which is too low
due to social biases) but below 50% (innate differences prevent this). While this conclusion seems
anticlimactic, any claim beyond this (e.g. that the fair level of enrollment is close to 50%) would be
mere opinion, as it would assume that one of the two contributions dominates.
E. Fairness and freedom of choice
The ethical redefinition of under-representation is an improvement but does not suffice. If all women
studied science then obviously there would be no under-representation. However, this would be far
from ideal since it would require forcing many women to study science against their will. Indeed,
under-representation —even redefined ethically— is intrinsically asymmetric: it can see when there is
too little but is blind to cases of too much. A symmetric criterion would say that women should be
neither barred from nor forced to the field. One can notice that this is not based on averages but on
individuals. In effect, this means giving up the superfluous concept of under-representation altogether,
which was a bad way of referring to an actual problem. We will simply say that fairness exists when
all women can graduate in a field congruent with their abilities and desires. One must also notice that
enrollment numbers too are irrelevant, since they take women to be undistinguishable.
Should there be more women in science and engineering? No, there should only be more women in
science and engineering who want to be in these fields. The argument of Sec. II based on efficacy and
the fairness argument we just considered lead to surprisingly similar conclusions. We can therefore be
confident that our conclusion that every woman should be allowed to graduate in a field congruent
with her abilities and desires is robust. We did find a good reason to increase female enrollment in
science and engineering, but it applies only under precise conditions.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR OUTREACH PROGRAMS
As we have seen, many people argue that there should be more female students in science and
engineering. The next step they take is to try and increase female enrollment in these fields. A
popular solution takes the form of outreach programs towards K–12 girls (generally in high schools
but not only), giving them a more hands-on experience of science and engineering (Anderson &
Northwood, 2002; Baum, 1990; Cohoon, 2002; Moskal, 2000; Muller & Pavone, 1997; Rockland et al.,
2002; Sullivan et al., 2003; Zywno et al., 1999).
While the primary aim of this article is to analyze arguments in favor of a greater female enrollment
in science and engineering, it seems natural to also look at their consequences for outreach programs.
Yet, exactly how the collapse of the usual justifications affects outreach will be for its practitioners to
determine: they are in the best position to evaluate and alter the programs in which they are involved.
This section can but provide some possible leads.
7A. The more the better
Outreach programs are considered “recruitment” and their success is measured in terms of number
of participants who eventually enroll in science and engineering (Anderson & Northwood, 2002; Baum,
1990; Brainard & Carlin, 1998; Chubin et al., 2005; Cohoon, 2002; Cuny & Aspray, 2000; Gosink,
2001; Grose, 2006; Lane, 1999; Moskal, 2000; Roberts et al., 2002; Rockland et al., 2002; Sullivan
et al., 2003; Zywno et al., 1999). Clearly, this equates more with better: the purpose is to get as many
women as possible to scientific fields, independently of what these women want. Bean counters may
parade as grand liberators, but even when the rhetoric mentions a free career choice —e.g. “women
pursuing their interests in science” (Muller & Pavone, 1997, emphasis added)—, success is measured
in terms of enrollment numbers. Free the beans!
One must keep in mind that the reason why outreach programs were created in the first place was
that the number of females in science and engineering was artificially low, due to the impossibility for
girls to freely choose a career in these fields. Outreach programs tend towards the opposite extreme:
an impossibility for girls to freely choose against a career in science or engineering. It would certainly
be paradoxical to trample their right to a free choice in order to enforce it. Sharing one’s love for
science and engineering and trying to cancel out a negative bias are very different from preaching
the science gospel and actively converting girls. Manipulating a girl towards science is not any more
acceptable than manipulating her away from it.
Some insist that many outreach programs are voluntary. Yet, one cannot say that outreach is
justified because girls cannot choose freely their career and that outreach cannot be an issue because
the girls freely choose to attend. Either girls can choose freely and outreach is pointless or girls are
not free to choose and outreach can indeed create a new servitude. In either case, outreach programs
shortchange girls.
B. Who makes the choice?
Some will also counter that none of the authors cited actually argued that women should be forced
into science and engineering. Yet, none argued that women should not be forced into these disciplines
either. Nor do they at any time explain how they try to prevent this from happening. The question
of freedom of choice thus seems morally neutral to them (while the claim may not be explicit, it is
embodied in their actions). Since they do not see freedom of choice as relevant, they cannot take it
into account.
Studies show that “people form enduring interests in activities in which they view themselves to
be self-efficacious” yet “people may rely more on perceived than tested abilities in formulating their
interests.” (Lent et al., 1994). By showing girls that they can be successful in science or engineering,
one does not expunge past influences to increase their freedom of choice. Rather one generates a new
influence, this time in favor of the scientific disciplines. It is not possible to erase social biases, one
can only overwrite them: outreach is bound to tamper with the girls’ interests and manipulate girls
towards scientific fields.
Take three girls. Tell the first one how rewarding engineering is and show her that she can be a
successful engineer. Do the same with the other two girls and medical and law schools. What will
happen? The first girl will graduate in engineering, the second in medicine, and the third in law.
Does the outcome correlate with what girls want? Not at all. It correlates with the viewpoint that
they have heard. We are the ones making a decision by choosing what information we give them.
C. Reinventing outreach
While the idea that more is better is clearly mistaken, finding a practical replacement is not straight-
forward: obviously, assessing the match between a (possibly unexpressed) preference and a career is
more difficult than assessing enrollment. Just as obviously, one should never set a goal just based on
how easily success can be evaluated.
Were we to tell girls all they need to know about the many alternatives (science, engineering,
law, medicine, business, journalism, teaching, art, staying at home, etc.), they may be able to make a
personal informed choice. Those who believe that engineering has mostly an image problem (e.g. Wulf,
81998) would expect this to ‘solve the problem’ since, even if competing choices are also presented in a
fair way, engineering would benefit the most. If they are right then the issue of low female enrollment
can be resolved without trampling the rights of the girls to choose freely. One can notice that this is
not science and engineering outreach anymore, but rather fair and neutral career counseling.
One must not overestimate the impact of the rejection of the typical arguments. Indeed, an invalid
demonstration does not make the theorem one is trying to prove false. Strictly speaking, the fact that
none of the arguments supposed to justify a greater female enrollment actually does does not prove
that outreach programs are an error. What it does show is that there currently is no valid justification
for the outreach programs in their current form. One may either revise them to make them consistent
with what justifies them (i.e. make them justified) or one may propose a new argument proving their
validity. In any case, one cannot continue programs devoid of rational justification.
V. CONCLUSION
Many in science and engineering hold this truth to be self-evident, that there should be more women
in the field. We considered several commonly proposed justifications: higher salaries, the possibility
to help others, the increasing need for engineers, and the impact of diversity on new designs. When
made explicit and seriously scrutinized, they in fact show that there should be a mutual attraction
between women and scientific fields. This attraction is not universal so that there should be more
women in science and engineering only inasmuch as women actually want to graduate in these fields.
Many claim that women are under-represented in science and engineering and that, out of fairness,
their enrollment should be increased. Yet, under-representation is statistical in nature, it is neither
right nor wrong. We therefore redefined it to make it an ethical concept. Although an improvement,
this still had a shortcoming: its asymmetry. We finally settled on a criterion which did not men-
tion under-representation and simply states that all women should be allowed to graduate in a field
congruent with their abilities and desires. This conclusion is similar to that obtained from mutual
attraction.
As currently conceived, outreach means trying to sell our product (science and engineering) to
as many potential female customers as possible. It does not aim at empowering women to choose
freely any more than any other sales pitch does. Since drawing always more women to science and
engineering violates their right to choose a career freely, a change of mindset —a ‘paradigm shift’—
from increasing enrollment to increasing freedom is necessary. Since present outreach is incompatible
with its justifications, programs have to be modified to be really justified (or better arguments must
be proposed to justify the programs in their current form). Of course, this is easier said than done:
trying to allow women to choose a field freely would be a moral dream but also a practical nightmare.
Nevertheless, one cannot go on undisturbed on a path which appears to be the wrong one.
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